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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

-----------------------------------------------------------JULIA HOTTINGER, and
LAMONT DASTRUP,
Plaintiffs
and Appellants,

-vsETHEL R. JENSEN,
Defendant
and Respondent.
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Case No.

18147

Appeal from a Judgment in the Sixth Judicial District
Court, Sanpete County, the Honorable Don v. Tibbs presiding.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Paul R. Frischknecht
50 North Main Street
Manti, Utah 84642
Attorney for DefendantRespondent
Dale M. Darius
P.O. Box u
29 South Main Street
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Attorney for PlaintiffsAppellants
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ISSUE PRESENTED
·~

,~

Whether the requirements of "Boundary by Acquiescence"
are satisfied in the factual situation where a common owner
conveys away part of his estate and for 15 years the-·abutting
owners agreed to, knew and understood a certain fence line was
the boundary but where the present abutt_ing owners , purchased
.,.;•

the disputed property without knowing the fence line was the
boundary, but who nevertheless made no claim to any property
beyond said fence until some 7 years had elapsed in addition
to the stated 15 year period.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent owned certain property in 1958; in that same
year, Respondent conveyed a portion of said property to Ray
..~.

and Georgia Jones.

The property in question was subsequently

conveyed and sold by Jones' to N.E. Anglin, and subsequently
conveyed and sold by Anglin to Denton A. Dove.

In 1973,

Dove sold __ the property in question to LaMont Dastrup and Julia
Hottinger, Appellants in this case.
The facts~· are undisputed that when the property was sold
in 1958 it was agreed and understood that the boundary between
the portion that was sold to Jon.es' and that remaining to the
Respondent was the most obvious and visible cedar post and
...
-
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net wire fence line in question.

When Jones' sold the property

to N.E. Anglin it was agreed, known and understood that the fence
line in question was the boundary line.

When Anglin subsequent~

".').

--

ly sold the property to Dove, it was agreed, known and understood
that the fence line was the boundary line.

When the property

was sold by Dove to LaMont Dastrup and Julia Hottinger, the
Appellants in' this case in 1973, there is no representation
as to where the boundary line was, but the fence was treated
as the boundary line.
When Appellants acquired the property in 1973 they made no
claim to any property opposite the Appellants side of the fence
in question until 1980, when a survey was performed and an
assertion was made by Appellants to ownership of property opposite their side of the fence in question.

The fence line in

question has been acquiesced in as a boundary line between
the Appellants, their predecessors in interest and.the Respendent from 1958 to 1980.
The disputed property in question-has been used by
Respondent since 1945 when she acquired it as a lawn and part
of a yard on the east side of her home, and also as a garden
spot to the south of her home.

The garden area has been fre-

quently tilled and of course the lawn and yard part has been
maintained.

In 1980 Appellants performed a survey and determined

that their deeds called for property on Respondent's side

-
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of the fence, whereupon claim was made by Appellants to
property on Respondent's side of the fence up to within a
few feet of her home.
ARGUMENT
Point I
ALL REQUIREMENTS OF THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY
ACQUIESCENCE HAVE BEEN SATISFIED.
The law seems to be clear in the State of Utah that the
necessary elements for establishment.of "Boundary by Acquiescence" are.as follows:
[a]

Occupation to a visible line marked by
monuments fences or buildings.

[b]

Acquiescence in the division line as
the property.

[c]

Acquiescence for a long period of time.

[d]

Acquiescence by adjoining land owners.

Holmes -vs- Judge, 31 Utah 269, 87 P. 1009· (1906);

Tripp -vs-

Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 276 P. 912 (1928); Brown -vs- Milliner,
120 Utah 16, 232 P.2d 202 (1951).
When the preceding requirements are met, a presumption
arises that the parties have agreed that the boundary should
be the one in which they acquiesced, wholly apart from whether
or not an actual agreement was made.

However, in spite of proof

that these prerequisites exist, the presumption is a rebuttable
one.

Holmes -vs- Judge,

(supra).

-
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In Lane -vs- Walker, 29 Utah 2d 119, 505 P.2d 1199 (1973);
·~

the Utah· Supreme Court in the application of ,the "Boundary by
Acquiescence" doctrine, when it was urged_up9n the Court
that there was no evidence showing the fence was mutually
intended to be the boundary, the Court said:
"To this we say that the test to establish the
boundary by "acquiescence" necess~rily need not
be based on mutual "intent".

"Intent" is not

synonymous with "acquiescence" in these cases.
"Acquiescence" is more nearly synonymous with
"indolence", or "consent by silence" . .

"

In the instant case from 1958 to 1973, the adjoining
property owners agreed, knew and understood that the boundary
between them and the Respondent was the fence line in question.
In 1973 when Appellants acquired the property, their acquiescence
in the fence line as the boundary, continued until the survey
was taken in 1980, at which time they made claim to the disputed.
property.

The trend of the law in Utah favors the time period

to exceed 20 years except in unusual circumstances.

Hobson -vs-

Panguitch Lake Corporation, 530 P.2d 792 (Utah 1975); Fuoco
-vs- Williams, 18 Utah 2d 282, 421 P.2d 944 (1966).

The Utah

Supreme Court has lessened that requirement and in a case involving
an acquiescence for less than 8 years, the Court held that
"Boundary by Acquiescence" doctrine was applicable with less

- 5 -
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than 8 years being sufficient to establish the acquiescence.
Ekberg -vs- Bates, 239 P.2d 205 (1951) •
. under 'the facts of the instant case, there was acquiescence
in the fence line as the boundary fromr 1958 to 1980 when the
survey was taken.

The law is cle.ar in· the State of Utah that

where the above referred to four elements exist as the necessary
prerequisites for establishing a valid ~oundary by acquiescence,
the burden of proof in establishing the rebuttable presumption
•

is clearly on the party who challenges the presumption created
in "Boundary by Acquiescence".

King -vs- Fronk, 14 Utah 135,

378 P.2d 893 .(1966).
The cases cited by Appellants, Hopson -vs- Panguitch Lake
Corporation,
and Wright

(supra); Halls -vs- Frakes, 600 P.2d 556 (Otah 1979);

~vs-

Clissold, 521

~.2d

1224 (Utah 1974); are

distinguishable from the instant case.
In the Hobson case (supra), the agreement establishing
the fence line was made by a party who did not own the property
at the time the agreement was made.
In the Halls case (supra) , the fence was erected off the
true boundary line not by agreement, but for specific purposes
of allowing for an expected road to be constructed and to control
livestock.
In the Wright case (supra) , the fence was erected not
to establish a boundary, but to control cattle.
In the instant case, Appellants predecessors in interest

- 6 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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.
'

I

,,:
~·' 1

,.

...
~~~:

expressly agreed, knew and understo6d that the fence in question
-

-

was the boundary___ and Appellants by
treated the fence line

as

th~ir

conduct or lack of it,
I

the boundary until 1980.

In Hobson (supra), the Court stated:
"The very reason for being of the doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence or agreement is that
in the interest of preserving the 1peace and good
order of society and quietly resting bones of
the past, which no one seems to have been
troubled or complained about for a long number
of years, should not be unearthed for the purpose
of stirring up controversy, but should be left
• r e pose • • .
to th eir

II

Id. at 794.
:·..~

Point II
EQUITY DEMANDS AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION.
· Based upon the stipulated facts, it is clear that Appellants
predecessors in interest and the Respondent agreed, knew and
understood that the well marked and visible fence line in
question was the boundary respected by each party.

When

Respondent, now over 80 years of age, intended to convey to
Jones' in 1958, the intent was to make the fence line the
boundary.

Unfortunately, when a third party prepared a deed
r

setting forth a meets and bounds description for execution

I
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by Respondent and conveyance to Appellants' predecessors in
interest, the meets and bounds description did not
the intent of the parties.

~omport

to

Unfortunately, the Respondent

was without sufficient expertise to determine from the description that it was in contradition to the parties intent.
The Appellants' predecessors in .interest and the Appellants
who acquired the prop$rty in 1973 to

198~,

always understood

and by action treate·a the boundary line between the parties
as the fence ·1ine.

They never possessed or made any claim

to the disputed property until 1980 when a survey was taken.

A finding for the Appellants would result in a lose of the
Respondent's lawn and trees and garden spot, and put the property
boundary within a few feet from the Respondent's home, which
was certainly not the intention, and would create an unfair
result to the Respondent.
CONCLUSION

It is the Respondent's contention· that the four prerequisites to establish "Boundary by Acquiescence" have been
established.

That acquiescence has continued for in excess

of 20 years, or that if it has not, the facts create an unusual
circumstance thereby lessening the generally viewed 20 year
requirement and 15 years being sufficient to establish the
doctrine.

That Appe_llants have failed to rebut the presumption

-
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created"by.the.Respondent meeting the prerequisites.
Respondent

~espectfully

requests the lower court's

decision. be: affirmed.
day of January, 1982.

DATED this

CH KNECHT
Attorney fo the Respondent
50 North Main Street
Manti, Utah 84642
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies
of

R~spondent's

Brief to:

Dale

M~

Darius, Esquire, Attorney at

Law, Post Office Box u,·29 South Main Street, Brigham City,

Utah, 84302, postage fully prepaid thereon, this

/qfJ:-'

of January, 1982.
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